


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


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2. [redacted] and I lunched with Mr. Darrell St. Claire, Chief Clerk in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate, with whom we discussed our problems with the Foreign Relations Committee and with various legislative proposals recently introduced in the Senate which would affect the Agency. Mr. St. Claire, a former Foreign Relations Committee staff member, gave his views of how the Committee and staff now operate. In response to our questions as to how best to get an informed view of the purposes and prospects of some of the recent legislative proposals, he suggested a private conversation with Senators Mansfield and Aiken jointly.

Mr. St. Claire agreed to stand ready to speak to the Agency's Senior Seminar if the scheduled speaker (possibly Senators Goldwater, Dominick or Hollings) had to cancel at the last minute. 25X1



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SATELLITES SPOT A SOVIET BUILD-UP FOR ATOMIC ARMS

Many Silos Reported as Well
as Increased Facilities to
Build Missile Vessels

SUBMARINE TALLY IS 41

U.S. Officials Cite Urgency
of Reaching an Agreement
on Weapons Control

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10—Satellite photos of the Soviet Union have uncovered evidence of a substantial build-up of more and better strategic nuclear weapons.

The new information shows that the Russians are continuing to build two new classes of silos, or emplacements, for large missiles, are constructing yet a third type of new silo, and are doubling the production facilities for Soviet missile submarines.

Some officials in the State and Defense Departments and the White House say this build-up increases the need to secure at least a first-step arms control agreement as soon as possible.

Others throughout the Government privately stress that unless this build-up is stopped soon, the United States may feel impelled to expand its own nuclear arsenal to maintain a balance of strategic power.

Reluctance on Details

A senior Pentagon official, pressed for details on the extent and character of the Soviet nuclear program, insisted that the arms-control talks were at such a delicate stage that the

Defense Department did not intend to provide details of the build-up until its next annual report to Congress in February.

Other officials in various Government departments were sufficiently concerned, however, to sketch out some details of the Soviet build-up.

The reconnaissance satellites have found that the number of silos of two different sizes generally believed designed for improved or entirely new long-range missiles now exceeds 90—up from the 10 noted early this year and 60 seen in mid-summer. The smaller of these silos is significantly larger than the 10-foot diameter of the Russian's largest operational missile, the SS-9.

A third type of silo, larger than the others, has been sighted, with one each at several missile complexes. Analysts believe the new holes are destined either for a special-purpose new missile or a new

type of command and control facility.

The Russians now have about 41 Y-class missile submarines ready or under construction, thus drawing abreast of the American Polaris submarine force. The new intelligence findings indicate a doubling in size of the principal Soviet nuclear submarine construction yard at Severodvinsk, on the White Sea.

1,600 Reported Completed

The total number of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, completed or under construction, is said to exceed 1,600, compared with 1,054 for the United States. In addition, nearly 100 Soviet ICBM silos at test and training centers would be expected to be put to use in a crisis; the United States has only a handful of such test silos.

The intelligence reports indicate that the Russians are working at what one senior official calls an "incredibly intense" pace in completing a ring of antiballistic missile sites around Moscow.

Publicly, the Administration, through the President, has emphasized the hope for early success in the talks to limit strategic arms, which have been on for two years.

On Sept. 25, President Nixon called the prospects good. Whether the two countries can achieve an initial agreement by year end, "no one can say at this point," he declared. "We have made progress. I believe the goal will be achieved."

No Charge of Blackmail

He concluded: "Neither power at this time could, if it wanted to, gain that superiority which would enable it to, frankly, blackmail the other one."

But privately, some senior officials are less optimistic. One official said:

"We have consistently underestimated the numerical goals of the Soviet missile programs for 10 years. We have also consistently assumed, incorrectly I'm afraid, that they bought our strategic concept of deterrence."

"The obviously don't want a nuclear war any more than we. But they're building a sufficient edge in nuclear strength, and in conventional forces as well, so they may have reason to expect us to back down in future confrontations, as we made them do in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962."

Aim Is Deterrence

The American strategy is based on having a nuclear force that can ride out a surprise attack and retaliate against the attacker's cities rather than against his remaining nuclear weapons. By maintaining such an "assured destruction" capability, the strategy seeks to deter nuclear war.

The arms-limitation talks are aimed at curbing the number of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons to the point where neither side would feel confident that it could destroy the retaliatory capability of the other in a surprise attack.

Administration officials differ on the kind of missiles that are to be deployed in the more than 90 new missile silos being built at locations east and west of the Ural Mountains.

The majority of analysts believe the Soviet Union would not build the huge silos unless it intended to install much improved versions of the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBM's or even new generations of missiles with improved accuracy, reliability and warheads.

Security a Possible Purpose

A minority view holds that the new silos are designed to provide greater security against attack.

Silos of both types have been constructed at the Tyuratam missile test center and test firings are expected soon. Data from such tests should dispell much of the mystery surrounding the new silos, analysts believe.

The third type of new silo, about four feet wider than the largest ever seen, has now been spotted, with one each at several complexes.

Analysts are mystified about the purpose of these silos. Some speculate that they could house well protected command and control centers from which Russian missile officers could command nearby ICBM's in a war. Others believe the holes are designed for a special purpose missile that is being dispersed to achieve greater protection against concentrated attack.

Among the possibilities cited are the following: missiles designed to carry special communications satellites to communicate with Russian missile submarines just before or during a nuclear war; big rockets set off very large explosions over the United States in an attempt to black out its radar and communications temporarily or make it difficult to fire ICBM's through large radioactive cloud, and large missiles to carry orbiting bombs in a crisis to persuade the United States to back down, much as the forward flights of American B-52 bombers during the Cuban missile confrontation were designed to force the Russians to remove their missiles from Cuba.